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The Effects of College Education on Career 
Earnings in the NBA 
George Langelett, Kuo-Liang Chang & Michael Haupert* 
ABSTRACT. The purpose of our research is to investigate whether the high school 
basketball player is better off attending or forgoing his college career to enter the NBA 
directly out of high school. We measure "better off' by total salary earned in the first ten 
years of a player's NBA career. Using both OLS and a Heckit model, to control for 
possible sample selection bias, our results suggest that although college is an investment 
period for athletes, rational athletes do understand the opportunity cost of each year spent 
in college, with the most talented players forgoing their college education altogether. 
(130, J44, 150). 
I. Introduction 
In 1995 the Minnesota Timberwolves drafted Kevin Garnett out of 
Farragut Academy (high school). The selection of Garnett changed the 
nature of the NBA draft, creating a dilemma for both players and NBA 
teams. 1 This new dilemma was whether potential NBA players should 
forgo their college education and immediately start their professional 
careers with the possible payoff of a lucrative contract, or continue to 
play college ball for free, investing in valuable human capital in the 
process.2 On behalf of the NBA teams, this draft development created a 
new dimension of decision-making and increased risk. By drafting a 
player directly out of high school, teams were betting on highly uncertain 
potential talent. 
Young men experience some of the greatest changes in their athletic 
development during their college years. A percentage of athletes reach 
their potential during college years, while many potential superstars never 
reach expectations for a plethora of reasons including injuries, burnout, 
personal and family problems, academic difficulties, and substance 
abuse. 
Compounding this problem is the reality that with only two rounds 
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in the NBA draft, in order to draft a player out of high school, teams must 
forgo a talented player who has reached his athletic potential in college 
and could immediately contribute at the NBA level. Developmentally, 
the high school athlete may be years away from being competitive at the 
NBA level. But on the flip-side, if a team decides to draft talent that has 
been developed over the course of a college career instead of potential 
high school talent, they risk losing the top talent available, as evidenced 
by the Minnesota Timberwolves drafting Kevin Garnett and Charlotte 
drafting Kobe Bryant. 
Li and Rosen ( 1998) explain that for firms facing asymmetric 
information about potential employee performance, if an unraveling 
mechanism becomes part of employment contracts, firms become less 
risk adverse and have an opportunity to hire potentially riskier 
employees. Grossthuis, Hill, and Perri (2007) apply the theory of contract 
unraveling to NBA firm behavior. They demonstrate that with the change 
in league policy to lengthen rookie contracts from 2 years to a 4th year 
option, with the accompanying league-controlled pay scale, individual 
teams have an incentive to engage in riskier behavior regarding their 
rookie draft picks. They demonstrate empirically that teams have engaged 
in drafting potentially risker prospects since the change in the league 
contracts. While previous studies have focused on incentives for the 
managementofNBA teams, by contrast, our study instead focuses on the 
behavior of the athlete, particularly, high school prospects facing an 
optimization decision of when to declare oneself eligible for the NBA 
draft. 
For the potential athlete, the decision to forgo college basketball and 
declare eligibility for the NBA draft has personal implications. During a 
player's college career, he is under the tutelage of some of the greatest 
development coaches in the country; is able to hone his fundamental 
skills such as shooting, ball handling, rebounding and defense by playing 
against much higher caliber competition than experienced in high school; 
and has the opportunity to develop his intuition and understanding of 
game dynamics. 
The college years are when student athletes have an opportunity to 
develop their human capital and acquire social capital. Most importantly, 
for most college basketball players, their athletic scholarship provides 
them the opportunity to earn a college degree, which will aid their career 
development outside of basketball - a likely necessity for most college 
athletes.3 
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But each year of development in college is not free. The opportunity 
cost for the student athlete is potentially enormous. Instead of playing in 
college for no salary, each year the potential star could be making 
millions of dollars in the NBA. Also, each season the student athlete 
plays college hoops, the athlete is exposed to potential career-ending 
injuries. 
The purpose of our research is to ask whether the high school 
basketball player is better off going to college and developing his 
professional skills, including human and social capital, or forgoing his 
college career to enter the NBA directly out of high school. We employ 
a narrow definition of "better off' as a higher total salary in the first ten 
years of a player's NBA career. A ten year cutoff was required for data 
reasons, and will be explained later. We include only those players who 
actually entered the NBA, as opposed to high school and college athletes 
who were not successful in their attempts to play NBA basketball. Ten 
years of earnings in the NBA are used to compare the success of players 
drafted out of high school to those drafted out of college. 
II. Background 
Pay in any profession is determined by three primary variables: the skill 
set the employee brings to the job, including human and social capital; 
employee performance or merit on the job; and the market structure of 
the profession. The degree to which each of these variables contributes 
to employee pay may vary significantly across occupations, but together 
these three determinants explain employee compensation in virtually 
every profession. 
Human capital represents the natural ability, skill set, experiences, 
and "know how" the worker brings to the job.4 Economists model human 
capital as people making investments that will better themselves in their 
careers. These investments include formal education, vocational training, 
on-the-job training, and experiences that make the employees more 
productive at their job. Social capital is the employee's ability to 
effectively communicate, get along with one's colleagues, and work 
efficiently with others. In the NBA, social capital is required for 
teamwork, leadership, and the always important "public relations." 
Employee performance, or merit pay, is the economic notion of 
marginal revenue product. That is, employees are paid according to their 
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productivity, as measured by the amount of additional revenue they bring 
into the finn. Assuming qualified and productive labor is relatively scarce 
and performance varies across individual workers, employers have an 
incentive to give pay increases to their workers based on individual 
perfonnance. 
The market structure of the profession is the economic market 
structure of the industry. Market structure may range from monopoly to 
perfect competition, each with associated market power and ability to 
capture economic rents. Internal market structure also affects worker 
pay. Job characteristics, including job hazards and qualifications that 
detennine the available labor pool, industry and finn location, local and 
internal job markets, product maturity, union presence, and finn size and 
organization all contribute to employee wages. 
III. The NBA Labor Market 
Michael Wallace (1988) presents an overview of the three pay 
detenninants for professional basketball players in the NBA. The human 
capital basketball players bring to the NBA is the set of basketball skills, 
such as shooting, ball handling, rebounding and defense. Human capital 
is developed throughout a player's high school and college years as well 
as his career in the NBA. A player's draft position in the NBA draft and 
number of years experience in the league are two indicators of human 
capital. 
Merit is measured by the performance of the athlete. David Berri 
(1999) models the contribution of player statistics (both offensive and 
defensive) to team wins. Faced with free agency in the NBA, teams are 
forced to pay their more productive players a competitive wage or lose 
them to another team after they become eligible for free agency, usually 
in their third or fourth year in the league. Thus, players in the NBA are 
compensated according to their perfonnance on the court. 
The market structure of the NBA could be modeled as either a 
monopoly or oligopoly ( competing with other sports, such as the NFL 
and NHL for attendance and television ratings). Market structure 
variables internal to the NBA include union presence and labor 
negotiations, discrimination, individual team markets, labor 
segmentation, and the salary cap. Labor negotiations over salary 
contracts occur between the National Basketball Players Association 
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(NBPA), formed in 1954, and the league owners. 
Discrimination in the NBA is a topic studied at length by economists. 
Kahn and Sherer (1988) used eleven player productivity variables to 
estimate the racial wage gap during the 1985-86 season. After 
controlling for productivity differences, they found a twenty-five percent 
wage gap between black and white players. Likewise, Koch and 
VanderHill (1988) used college and NBA statistics and market 
characteristics to determine player salaries. They also found a pay 
advantage for white athletes in the NBA. But a more recent study, Dey 
( 1997), found that after controlling for player performance statistics from 
1987 to 1993, while a significant salary gap for black players was present 
in 1987, by 1992 it had disappeared. Dey attributes this closing of the 
salary gap to free agency, an increase in the productivity of black 
athletes, and a change in customer preferences. Hill (2004) does not find 
evidence of any pay discrimination when investigating the NBA in the 
1990s. He adds height to the performance, draft, and experience 
variables used by others, and measures these variables over the previous 
three years, instead of just one. 
We are not so much interested in the discrimination literature as the 
models used to measure the determinants of salary. In one of the earliest 
articles on NBA labor markets, Robert Mogull ( 1977) found evidence 
that blacks and whites were rewarded differently for performance criteria. 
He regresses salary on several performance variables.5 These 
performance variables, sometimes weighted by games played, remain 
common throughout the NBA labor literature. In various combinations 
these same independent variables have been used by Hamilton ( 1997), 
Gius and Johnson (1998), Hoang and Rascher (1999), Leonard and 
Prinzinger ( 1999), Eschker, Perez, and Siegler (2004 ), Groothuis and Hill 
(2004), Kahn and Shah (2005), Stroh (2007), and Yang and Lin (2010). 
Jenkins ( 1996) adds a position dummy and indexes production variables 
for both career and season. Hoang and Rascher added draft position and 
frequency of a player being traded. Eschker, Perez, and Siegler added a 
superstar effect and player age. Groothuis and Hill (2004) used a hazard 
function with the typical performance variables, adding draft position, 
height, weight, and race in an attempt to determine impacts on the 
duration of player careers. 
Team markets are divided primarily between large market teams and 
small market teams. Large market teams, with greater gate and television 
revenues, have larger budgets for their team payrolls. Thus, teams in 
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larger markets are better able to compete for talent by offering higher 
player salaries.6 
The labor market in the NBA is divided by player position: forwards, 
centers, and guards, with salaries for each position determined by supply 
and demand. Likewise, salaries in the labor market can be divided 
between starters and players that fill the bench on each team. Finally, 
player mobility plays a role in the labor market. The basketball lockout 
of 1998-99, and the subsequent negotiations that followed, led to an 
agreement that drafted rookies would sign three-year contracts. After the 
third year teams could extend the player's contract for a fourth year. In 
the fifth year the player would become a free agent, with the club having 
the right of first refusal. The right of first refusal gives the player's team 
the opportunity to match salary offers made by any other team in order 
to retain the services of the athlete. 
Following the labor negations of the 1998-99 lockout, the "salary 
cap" was revised for NBA teams. During the first three years, new player 
salaries were set by the league. After the third year, a player's salary 
could rise by a maximum of 12% annually. Total player salaries for each 
team are not to exceed 57% of each team's revenues. Each year 10% of 
player salaries are put into an escrow account. If player salaries exceed 
57% of team revenues, money is taken out of the escrow account and 
given back to the team owner to make up the difference. 
IV. High School Players in the NBA 
Moses Malone was the first basketball player to play American 
professional basketball without first having played in college. He joined 
the now defunct American Basketball Association (ABA) in 1974. The 
ABA eventually merged with the NBA in 1976. At the time, the NBA 
did not allow players to enter its league without having first attended 
college. That restriction no longer exists, though the NBA did recently 
institute a minimum age requirement to join the league.7 
Since 1995, when our data set begins, 40 players have been drafted 
directly out of high school by NBA teams. Since Kevin Garnett was 
drafted in 1995, through 2005, at least one high school player was drafted 
each year. In fact, except for 1997 and 2002, at least two high school 
players were drafted each year, with an astonishing ten high school 
players selected in 2005 (Figure 1 ). This is even more impressive 
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considering that the NBA draft has only two rounds, consisting of 60 
total picks. 
In 2006 the NBA changed its policy, establishing a minimum age of 
19 for draft eligibility. Since 2006, the NBA has instead drafted more 
talented players from European leagues and from across the developing 
world. Thus, the years 1995 -2005 provide a unique time period to study 
the decision making behavior of high school basketball stars as they face 
the choice between college or the NBA. 
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Figure 1. NBA Draft by Cohort 
V. Methodology 
College education will be modeled as an investment by athletes in human 
and social capital. For the athlete, the college years are a period of time 
when players develop their athletic talent (human capital). The NBA 
draft is modeled as the League's assessment of the stock of human capital 
(i.e. proficiency at the game of basketball) each player has acquired at the 
start of his career in the NBA. 
There are numerous variables that affect the length and quality of a 
player's career, including work ethic, injuries, and luck. Since we know 
of no way to measure these, we will instead use the ceteris paribus 
assumption to model player careers in the NBA. For purposes of 
32 The Journal of Economics, XXXIX, No. 1, 2013 
studying the effects of human capital formation during the college years 
on each player's career, NBA careers will be modeled as dependent on 
the stock of human capital each player brings into the NBA. 8 Thus, the 
NBA draft will be modeled as the league's assessment of each player's 
potential stock of human capital at time period = 0. We want to test the 
hypothesis that college education has a positive and significant 
contribution to the career earnings of an NBA player. 
The difficulty with any assessment of potential is that in a 
competitive industry potential ability (human capital developed in 
college) does not always correlate positively with actual performance. 
Thus, the first three years, which is the length of the standard rookie 
contract, tend to be a probationary period when teams evaluate the actual 
performance of each new player. During this probationary period athletes 
will either fail to be competitive at the NBA level, and have a career of 
less than three years; or excel in performance, and have a long career. 
Therefore, we model a player's first three years in the NBA as a 
probationary period, where teams are assessing whether each athlete can 
be competitive at the NBA level of competition. 
There are numerous difficulties in trying to compare careers in the 
NBA based on player performance variables, including variable weights, 
disaggregation of player versus team effects, and annual versus career 
statistics. We simplify this problem by using career earnings in the 
league to measure each player's career. Assuming players are paid their 
marginal revenue product, career earnings become a good measure of 
each player's performance during his NBA career. Thus, the basic model 
utilized in this paper is: 
Player's NBA Career Earning= f (Player's stock of human (1) 
capital, Social capital, On the job performance) 
Our study uses data from 1995, the year Kevin Garnett started his career 
in the NBA, through 2010, the latest year for which data are available. 
Career earnings in the NBA are discounted back to 1995 to produce a 
present value of earnings. To make the salary data linear, the natural log 
of the present value of career earnings is used. Six years of draft data 
were used in our study, starting with the 1995 draft and ending with 
2000. For the year 2000 draft, ten years of player career data is available. 
Thus, to create a consistent comparison of player careers across draft 
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years, for each year's draft, the first ten years of player data were used to 
proxy player performance. 
Thus, the salary variable becomes: 
( 
salary, 




Where j = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, depending on the year of the draft. 
(2) 
Two primary variables are used to model the right hand side of 
equation (1 ). First, each player's draft position is used to measure the 
league's ex-ante assessment of each athlete's stock of human capital. 
Second, each player's education is used to measure his investment in 
human capital. Years of college experience is used to measure the effects 
of a college education, with values ranging from zero to four. Players 
drafted out of high school are given a value of zero.9 
Two variables that affect each athlete's stock of human capital are 
player position and race. Also, two dummy variables are used to control 
for player position: one for forwards and another for centers. Since a 
player's race has been shown to impact salaries and has the potential to 
affect the league's judgment of the athlete's marketability for 
employment, we include it as a dummy variable.10 
Finally, three control variables are added to the model. First, a 
dummy variable for the division of the college is used to proxy the 
quality of the capital formation experience during an athlete's time in 
college. Division- I college basketball schools are given a value of 1. All 
other colleges were given a value of 0. The assumption is that playing a 
higher level of competition at a Division- I school will positively affect 
the athlete's human capital formation experience. Second, to control for 
player performance during the probationary period in the NBA, two 
additional variables are included. Average-minutes-per-game and 
number-of-games-played are included to proxy player performance 
during his first three years in the league. These two control variables 
assume that regardless of position, athletes who are performing well in 
the NBA will play both more games, and more minutes during each 
game. 
The basic empirical model used to test the effects of human capital 
formation during college becomes: 
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Career earnings = a1 +a2 Draft +a3 College +a4 Division I (3) 
+a5 Forward +a6 Center +a7 Race +a8 Games +� Minutes + e 1 
Where Draft is the player's draft position; College is the number of years 
of college education; Division I is a college-tier dummy; Forward and 
Center are player position dummies; Race is a dummy variable; Games 
is the number of games played during the first three years; and Minutes 
are the average number of minutes played per game during the first three 
years in the NBA. 
Given that 15 years of data are available, and this study investigates 
career earnings over a ten year period, our dataset consists of all players 
drafted from 1995 to 2000 . 1 1  With 5 8 players drafted each year for six 
years, the sample includes 34 7 players. 12  In order to avoid biasing the 
educational attainment variable, 28 foreign players were removed from 
the sample. Likewise, 66 additional players were removed from the 
sample because they never played a single game in the NBA. Including 
these players would cause censorial problems with both the games-played 
and the minutes played variables. 13 Thus, our resulting sample size has 
253 observations. 
VI. Heckman's 2-Stage Model (Heck.it) 
Not surprisingly, there is a noteworthy gap in career earnings between 
players who survived the first three-year trial period and those who did 
not. This characteristic suggests a potential problem of sample selection 
bias caused by many other factors determined before these players 
reached the NBA draft. For example, human capital theory commonly is 
applied to explain such performance differences, and focuses on the 
resulting "endowment" differences in players' skills and talent before 
they were drafted. Thus, one may argue that players who had already 
accumulated enough skills to excel in their NBA career out of high 
school tend to forgo college. We expect that a significant portion of the 
differences in NBA performance during the probationary period is a 
product of these unobservable variables that are beyond the scope of this 
study. 
However, if the selection bias exists as the wage gap data suggest, the 
conventional OLS method becomes questionable when we attempted to 
estimate equation (3). Besides, for those players who did not make it 
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through the first three years, their annual income from years 4 to 10 was 
obviously zero. We wanted to emphasize that this zero income is an 
indicator to show the performance of each player also affects the 
magnitude of career earnings. Therefore, the application of the Tobit 
model becomes conceptually unsuitable since the data is not really 
"censored." 14 Instead, we apply Heckman's two-stage model to correct 
for the problem of sample selection bias as suggested by Heckman 
(1979); Maddala (1992) and Greene (2000). Moreover, the first three 
years in the NBA appear to be a probationary period when teams are 
evaluating the performance of recently drafted athletes. The majority of 
athletes in the NBA play either for three or fewer years or more than ten 
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Figure 2. 
Therefore, without making any unnecessary assumptions, we created a 
dummy variable called passing-grade (PG) to estimate the probably of 
surviving the first three years of an NBA career after the draft. We 
assume: 
Passing Grade = f (Player performance during first 
three years in NBA). 
(4) 
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Players with a 1 -3 year career were coded "O" for PG, and players with 
a 4+ year career were coded " l "  for PG. In the first stage we estimate PG 
using the binomial probit model. That is, 
PG=l if PG* >O and 
PG=O if PG* <= 0 
(5) 
Sequentially, "average-minutes-per-game" and "number-of-games­
played" during an athlete's first three years in the NBA become the 
instrumental variables used to estimate Passing Grade (PG) in the first 
stage. 
First Stage Estimation: 
Passing Grade= b1 +b2 Draft +b3 College +b4 Division 1 + (6) 
b5 Forward +b6 Center +b7 Race +bg Games +b9 Minutes + e 1 
After estimating the binomial probit in the first stage, the resulting 
inverse Mills ratio (A) will be stored and injected as an independent 
variable in the second stage of the Heckit Model to estimate career 
earnings: 
Career earnings = c1+c2 Draft +c3 College +c4 Division 1 + (7) 
c5 Forward +c6 Center +c7 Race +cg (}.) + e1 
Equation (7) estimates the effects of a college education on career 
earnings after controlling for the NBA's pre-career assessment (draft 
position) and sample selection bias problem. We hypothesize that the 
coefficient for the college education variable should be positive and 
significant. On the other hand, if we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
zero for the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio }. (i.e., cg), we should 
instead use OLS to estimate equation (3). For the purpose of comparison, 
we applied both a Heckit and OLS model in this study. 
Finally, we applied both the White's general test and the Breusch­
Pagan Lagrange multiplier test (Greene 2000; p. 508-5 1 1 )  to investigate 
the potential problem ofheteroscedasticity. The robust covariance matrix 
for the OLS model (equation (3)) generated the Chi-Squared statistic of 
24.61 (0.001 8), which indicated that the hypothesis of homoscedasticity 
is rejected. The LM statistics from the Breusch-Pagan tests suggested that 
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Draft, College, Games, and Minutes contained heteroscedasticity when 
regressed on Career earnings separately. However, we only found minor 
variations on the standard errors of the heteroscedasticity corrected 
(White) coefficients, compared to the original OLS results. Moreover, as 
suggested by Johnson and DiNardo (1997), while appending a White 
noise error causes no problem of bias in the liner model, the process may 
cause unknown bias in the nonlinear models such as pro bit for our Heckit 
model. The lack of standard method in hypothesis testing also makes the 
Probit model with heteroscedasticity difficult to interpret and analyze 
(Greene 2000). Therefore, in this study we report the original estimate 
results both for the OLS and Heckit models. But we would like to 
acknowledge the existence of heteroscedasticity in our results. 
VII. Results 
Table 1 lists career earnings (before the natural log is calculated) broken 
down according to the explanatory variables in equation (3). Foreign 
players are included in this table only for comparison purposes. The 
results indicate that the mean career earnings vary greatly across groups. 
Players drafted out of high school earned an average of $43 .5 million, 
while the mean for college seniors is $15 .9 million, and for foreign 
players is $17.4 million. By position, on average, forwards have the 
highest career earnings, and centers have the lowest. For the race 
variable, players of color now earn $6 million more than their white 
counterparts, a gap in the opposite direction of that found in research 
focusing on an earlier time period. 
Table 2 summarizes the results from Heckit and OLS. The 
regressions for equations (6) and (7) were run using the Heckit 2-stage 
regression model, and results obtained show that the coefficient 
associated with the inverse Mill's ratio (i.e., -1.86) is significant at the 
0.01 % level, which indicates that the correlation between the error terms 
of passing the first three years and career earnings are different than zero. 
This result suggests the existence of sample selection bias and offers a 
rationale to apply the Heckit model in our analysis. 
In the first stage, a binomial probit model is run to estimate an 
athlete's  probability of surviving the probationary period and going on to 
continue his career in the league as shown by equation ( 6). Five variables 
significantly affect an athlete's passing grade. First by position, forwards 
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and centers are more likely to survive than guards. Referring back to 
Table 1, the fact that there are only one half as many centers in the NBA, 
as opposed to either guards or forwards, may explain why being a center 
significantly affects one's passing grade at the 1 % statistical level. 
TABLE I-Descriptive Data of NBA Players 1995-2010 
Career Earnings real 1995 dol lars Years Pro 
N Min Mean Max Mean Standard 
Deviation 
White 76 $200,289 $1 9,607,328 $85,573 ,004 6.62 3 .89 
Color 205 $ 1 1 1 ,871 $25,855,578 $ 14 1 ,950,420 7.2 1 4.43 
Forward 124 $ 1 1 1 ,871 $26,063,285 $ 14 1 ,950,420 7.08 4.30 
Center 52 $200,289 $ 19,4 16,245 $8 1 ,479,000 6.98 4.00 
Guard 1 05 $1 75,289 $23 , 163 ,888 $97,035,346 7.06 4.48 
High 1 1  $ 163,821 $43,486,348 $ 14 1 ,950,420 6.70 4.20 
School 
1 year 10  $3,443,079 $46,325,60 1 $93,075,320 9.80 3.52 
college 
2 yrs 3 1  $200,000 $38,941 ,90 1 $95,299,820 8 .90 4.56 
college 
3 yrs 34 $320,000 $37,696,602 $97,029,704 9.06 3.70 
college 
4 yrs 1 67 $ 1 1 1 ,871 $ 1 5 ,992,605 $ 1 0 1 ,721 ,269 6 . 19  4.03 
college 
Foreign 28 $320,000 $ 1 7,41 1 686 $8 1 479,000 4.43 4.47 
Minutes played per game and games played during a player's first 
three seasons in the NBA significantly affect a player's passing grade 
after the third year in the NBA. For this reason, these two variables are 
used as sequential instrumental variables. Finally, early draft picks are 
more likely to survive the probationary period. 
In the second stage, career earnings in the NBA are estimated using 
Equation (7). Including an estimated passing grade for each athlete, after 
three years of performance in the NBA, only the variable Draft 
statistically significantly affects a player's career earnings in the NBA. 
Variables such as position, level of school, and most importantly, years 
of college education are all statistically insignificant. The results in Table 
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2 indicate that while position and performance affect the survival rate of 
any NBA players, career earnings are solely affected by the draft position 
for those players who survived the trial period. We failed to reject the 
null hypothesis that c3 in Equation (7) is significantly different than zero, 
which suggests that college education is not a crucial variable in 
determining career earnings. 
TABLE 2-Heckit 2-Stage and OLS Results 
Heckit Model OLS 
Stage 1 Stage 2 (Eq 3)  
(Eq 6) (Eq 7) 
Dependent Variable Passing F irst Natural Log of Natural Log of 
Three Year Career Earnings Career Earnings 
in NBA in NBA 
Constant -3.6 1 1 8 .44 1 3 .49 
(0.830)***  (0.329)8** (0.303)*** 
Draft -.03 -.04 -0.0 1 
(0.0 1 1  )***  (0.006)* * *  (0.004)** 
Years of College - . 1 0  -.06 -0.09 
(0. 1 56) (0.088) (0.059)* 
Division 1 School .03 .27 -0. 1 2  
(0.357) (.276) (0. 167) 
Forward .77 -. 1 3  0. 1 1  
(0.297)** *  (0. 1 87) (0. 1 1 9) 
Center 1 .4 1  -.3 1 0.55 
(.406)** *  (0.250) (0. 1 63)** 
Race -.54 .04 -.0 1 
(0.3 1 5) (0.2 16) (0. 1 32) 
Minutes Played per .08 0.03 
Game (0.0 1 5)*** (0.003)* ** 
Games Played first .004 0.01 
three years (0.002)** (0.001)***  
A (Inverse Mills Ratio) - 1 .86 
(0.244)***  
R-squared .61  (Pseudo R- .62 .78 
Squared) 
McFadden p 0.60 
A.LC. 0.54 .38 -.2 1 
Prob>Chi-Square 0.0002 
Standard errors in parenthesis; *Significant at the . 1 %  level; **Significant at the .05% 
level; ***Significant at the .01 % level. 
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The results from the Heckit model suggest that the career earnings of 
NBA players depend on the survival of the probationary period. But the 
determining factors of surviving are playing position, minutes, and games 
played. This finding is consistent with the results suggested by the OLS 
method: the variables that significantly affect a player's career earnings 
in the NBA are his position in the NBA draft, minutes played per game, 
number of games played in the first three years, and playing center. The 
signs on these statistically significant variables are also consistent with 
the results from Heckit. Players drafted earlier have a lower number 
(draft picks are assigned a number in the regression equal to their 
position in the draft) and on average play longer and have greater career 
earnings in the NBA. This suggests either that NBA general managers 
are good at projecting future NBA potential, or that they are afflicted 
with sunk cost bias, and will give players drafted early a longer trial 
period, lasting beyond the initial three year period. 16  The negative sign 
on years of college suggests each additional year of college ball lowers 
career earnings. Likewise, the positive coefficient on minutes played per 
game during the first three years suggests that players who were starters 
and played most of each game enjoy high career earnings in the NBA. 
Finally, the insignificant race variable suggests that salary discrimination 
in the NBA may no longer be an issue, though we do not directly test for 
this. Overall, the results presented in Table 2 suggest that the stocks of 
human and social capital endowed by each player before they entered the 
NBA are more important than education, including human capital 
formation in college, if maximizing career earnings in the NBA is a 
player's goal. 
VIII. Conclusions 
The argument against high school players in the NBA is usually some 
form of the argument that "high school players can't make it in the NBA. 
They should stay in college and hone their skills". Another version of the 
argument frequently made in favor of staying college is that a player who 
leaves college early will never have developed the necessary skills to 
survive in the NBA in the long run. In other words, college coaches argue 
that the skills players develop in college will create higher career 
earnings than the extra salary earned in the short run. 
Langelett, Chang & Haupert: The Effects of College Education 41 
The results present in Tables 1 and 2 provide mixed results for this 
argument that players go to college to build human capital for their NBA 
careers. Table l shows that on average, players directly out of high 
school have longer careers and higher career earnings than their college 
and foreign counterparts. This result seems to suggest that the 
exceptional basketball players make a rational decision to forego college 
to start their careers in the NBA. Based on career length, earnings, and 
draft position, players who go to college for one or two years to build 
human capital before starting their NBA careers do better than players 
who graduate from college. Players who have NBA potential, but are a 
step below their high school and underclassman counterparts in terms of 
basketball proficiency, spend up to four years in college to develop their 
human capital as NBA athletes. Table 2 shows that career earnings are 
not dependent on college attendance, but rather on draft position and 
performance during the first three years in the NBA. 
The results of this study suggest that although college is an 
investment period for athletes toward their careers in the NBA, rational 
athletes do understand the opportunity cost of each year spent in college, 
with the best players forgoing their college education altogether. Thus, 
it is unlikely that athletes who possess the required stock of human 
capital to compete at the NBA level make an economically irrational 
decision to forego college for the NBA. The criticism leveled by 
sportswriters and coaches that high school seniors, such as Kevin 
Garnett, Kobe Bryant and LeBron James would benefit by at least some 
college experience, does not hold up. The beneficiaries of such talented 
players working for free in the college ranks are the colleges, the NCAA, 
and the highly paid college coaches. 
In 2005, ten of 58 players chosen were drafted directly out of high 
school. These high school athletes understood the financial opportunity 
cost of playing in college, and made the rational choice to become draft 
eligible. The 2006 draft rule was the NBA's attempt to stem the ever­
increasing tide of high school students entering each year's draft. 
Sports writers now say that in retrospect the 2006 change in draft age 
was a misguided decision by the NBA. 17  The NBA desires future athletes 
to first get some formal college education, and thus, high school athletes 
are now attending college. Unfortunately players who already possess 
the athletic ability to compete in the NBA are now forced to attend 
college for a year until they reach the NBA mandated minimum age. 
This is a misallocation of resources and a transfer of economic rents from 
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players to colleges. It appears the rationale for keeping high school 
athletes out of the draft is more for the benefit of the NCAA and NBA 
owners than out of any real concern for the players. 
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Endnotes 
I .  In I 974 Moses Malone entered the old ABA without ever going to college. But 
Kevin Garnett was the first player drafted out of high school. Our paper focuses on 
high school players drafted since 1995, the firstyearofour comprehensive salary and 
draft data set. 
2. The NBA recently ruled that players must be I 9 years old or wait one year after 
graduating from high school to enter the draft. This ruling may be challenged in 
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court, but even if it stands, it merely pushes the choice between college and a 
potential professional career off by one year. 
3. There are approximately 900 colleges and universities in the United States that play 
basketball. Assuming that each roster is composed only of the NCAA limit of 1 3  
scholarship players, there are 1 1 ,700 men playing college basketball each year, 60 
of whom will be drafted. Since any college player is allowed to declare his eligibility 
for the draft, that means 0.5% of college basketball players are drafted each year. If 
only the (approximately) 350 division one schools are considered, then the 
percentage of players drafted increases to l .3%. 
4. Becker 1 964. 
5. The performance variables were field goals per minute, field goal percentage, free 
throws per minute, free throw percentage, rebounds per minute, assists per minute, 
points per minute, points per game, minutes per game and experience. 
6. The "soft" salary cap of 1 999 partially offsets this market size advantage. 
7. Kegler, 201 0. 
8 .  Although human capital formation continues throughout each athlete's career in the 
NBA, the human capital formation itself depends on the career of the athlete. Players 
who are relegated to careers as bench warmers or have their tenure terminated before 
or during their first year, have little opportunity to develop human capital, and thus 
their careers in the NBA are determined by the stock of human capital they possess 
as they enter the NBA. 
9. From 1 995 to 2000, 28 of the 34 7 players drafted by the NBA were foreign. 
Although some foreign players may have some college education, the educational 
records of many foreign players are difficult to assess. Because of the unclear 
educational records of foreign players, and the relatively small sample, foreign 
players drafted by the NBA were removed from the sample in order to focus our 
study on the effects of a college education. 
10. See Dey ( 1 997) and Hill (2004). 
1 1 . Draft position data were obtained from the Sporting News NBA Guides 1 995-2000. 
Player race, pos1t10n, and education are from www.NBA.com and 
www.databasebasketball.com. Annual salary data are from Rodney Fort's website 
at http ://users. pullman . com/rodfort/SportsBusiness/BizFrame.htm and 
www.usatoday.com website. 
12 .  Washington forfeited its 1 997 first-round pick in connection with its signing of 
Juwan Howard. Washington would have had the 1 7th pick overall. 
13 .  Running the regression both with and without the 49 observations of draftees who 
never played a game in the NBA did not change either the sign or the level of 
significance of the coefficient on the education-level variable. Thus, the results from 
our basic regression model were not affected, based on this reduction in sample size. 
14 .  Sigelman & Zeng, 1 999; Maddala, 1 992. 
1 5. In our dataset of players drafted from 1 995-2000, 74% of the players had careers of 
either 3 or fewer years or I O  or more years. 41 % had careers of 3 or fewer years and 
33% had careers often or more years. 
16 .  See Staw and Hoang ( 1 995). They test whether the amount of time played and career 
length are affected by draft order and find that NBA teams give more playing time 
to higher draft picks after adjusting for performance. 
1 7. Phil Kegler (20 I 0) 
